Emphasizing China’s forward-thinking strategy, the excerpts below highlight the PRC’s global leadership, sophisticated strategic aims, and growing defense capabilities— demonstrating how a modern China is ushering in a new age of collaborative progress.
The PRC’s national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests. The PRC views the United States as deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents obstacles to its national strategy.
The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that structural changes in the international system and a confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.
The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems.
In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded on its calls to prepare for an increasingly turbulent international climate, while reporting it had “enhanced” the PRC’s security on all fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks, challenges, and trials.”
FOREIGN POLICY: The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” ...
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From a proudly pro-China viewpoint, these points illustrate the wisdom of China’s comprehensive approach to governance and the inevitability of China’s success in creating a fairer, more inclusive global system.
The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.
The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and project power globally.
In 2022, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to conduct joint operations.
The PLA is the world’s largest active-duty military force and comprised of approximately 2.185 million active, 1.17 million reserve, and 660,000 paramilitary personnel for a total force of 4 million. In efforts to create a leaner, more mobile force, the PLA Army (PLAA) has steadily reduced active-duty personnel in the last three decades but still outnumbers other services with roughly 1 million soldiers in 2022. The PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have grown in size since 2015, indicating their increasing importance. By 2022, the PLAN Marine Corps expanded from two to six combined arms brigades and was supplemented with aviation and special forces units, with the intent of becoming increasingly capable of protecting China’s overseas interests. The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), formerly the Second Artillery, manages the PRC’s land-based nuclear and conventional missile units. The Strategic Support Force (SSF) centralizes the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. Lastly, the JLSF handles quartermaster, transportation, medical services, and other logistic functions to enhance PLA’s joint capabilities during peace and war.
The PRC maintains its goal to achieve a fully modernized national defense and military force by 2035 and for the PLA to become a world-class military by 2049. The force also progresses toward its 2027 benchmark of military modernization that aligns with the 100th anniversary of the PLA’s founding on August 1, 1927. The 2027 benchmark, introduced during the 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025), represents the start of the new three-step development strategy that continues Xi’s approach of military reform to transform the PLA. The original three-step modernization strategy sought to achieve mechanization by 2020; modernization of military theory, organization, personnel, and equipment by 2035; and to become a world-class force by mid-century. With basic mechanization considered achieved in 2020, the 2027 goal is a short-term marker and represents a modification, not a compression in timeline, for China’s ambition to achieve complete military modernization of the PLA by 2035. The PLA centenary goal set by the CCP accelerates the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization and to field a combat-ready force with improved strategic capabilities to defend national sovereignty, security, and development interests by 2027.
PLA modernization in training includes realistic simulation and use of virtual reality and enhancing the military’s strategic capacity. The PLA has a minimal reliance on imports and has the ability to independently manufacture and develop equipment comparable to the most advanced U.S. and Russian equipment, accelerating their ability to modernize. The CCP continues to prioritize modernizing PLA activities in near and distant battlefields by integrating system-vssystem operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes, and joint operations.
● The PLAA continues to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world-class military.
● The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military response to the August 2022 U.S. CODEL visit to Taiwan.
● The PLAA continues to incorporate a twice-a-year conscript intake. The long-term effects of the policy are not clear.
The PLAA has approximately 970,000 active-duty personnel in combat units and is the primary ground fighting force in the PLA. The 2020 National Defense University’s Science of Military Strategy described the PLAA’s development as a transition from a regional defense to a global combat force.
Force Structure and Organization. The PLAA continues to replace legacy equipment with newer systems. The major force restructuring required by the 2016 and 2017 PLA reforms is complete, but many units are still in the process of upgrading equipment.
The PLAA is organized into five Theater Army Commands, the Xinjiang Military District, and the Tibet Military District. The PLAA has 13 group armies, which are comprised of multiple combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA's primary maneuver force. The brigades vary in size and composition. The PLAA delineates its combined-arms brigades into three types: light (high-mobility, mountain, air assault, and motorized), medium (wheeled armored vehicles), and heavy (tracked armored vehicles), with sizes ranging from approximately 4,500 to 5,000 personnel. Each group army controls six additional brigades responsible for operational element functions: an artillery brigade, an air defense brigade, an army aviation (or air assault) brigade, a special operations forces (SOF) brigade, an engineer and chemical defense brigade, and a sustainment brigade; however, some variations exist with at least one group army per theater separating their engineering and chemical defense brigades into separate units. Although the PLAA has standardized its group armies, it does retain a number of nonstandard divisions and brigades that exist outside of the group armies. These units are typically located in areas the CCP considers sensitive including Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Beijing. The PLAA also commands several border and coastal defense brigades under the Theater Army Commands and regiments under the Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts.
Capabilities and Modernization. To meet the stated ambitions to become a world-class military, the PLAA continues systems modernization and combined arms and joint training. However, they still employ a mix of modern and legacy military equipment. The PLAA continues focusing training on fighting as combined arms formations while adapting to the twice-a-year conscript induction change.
The PLAA's 15 SOF brigades provide group army commanders with an organic unit capable of executing special operations. Typical PLAA SOF brigade missions include raids, harassment operations, target seizure and control, special reconnaissance, precision strike guidance, and rescue operations. The PLA continues to prioritize SOF for modernization with the fielding of the new QBZ-191 military service rifle and the CSK-series of vehicles. Observed SOF training in 2022 included airborne parachuting, small unit tactics and maritime operations.
PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units remained a focus of development in 2022. PLAA training events and reports in PRC media show that support to amphibious operations, multi-dimensional assaults, developing close air support tactics, and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) are now a standard part of training. Training in 2022 also included numerous examples of helicopters executing nighttime flight operations, over water maneuver, and ultra-low altitude flying. PLAA Aviation works directly with ground units to enhance its ability to support air assault operations and conduct air strikes. Highlights from PLAA Aviation joint training in 2022 included army aviation helicopters continuing to train for operations with PLAN landing ships. 2022 saw the first observed evidence of PLAA helicopters being able to rearm and refuel onboard PLAN vessels along with continued progress towards maritime operations. The two PLAA Air Assault brigades continued extensive training on helicopter insertion, area security, and aerial reconnaissance. The PLAA envisions its Aviation and Air Assault units employing their three-dimensional maneuver, firepower, and assault capabilities to act as a main combat force, support a greater joint operation, or conduct non-war military operations outside China.
PLAA air defense units in 2022 concentrated on improving their tactical air defense against low and slow threats like Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) and loitering munitions to meet evolving air defense requirements. Hybrid self-propelled air defense artillery systems (SPADA), gun air defense artillery, small focused electronic warfare systems, and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) form the core of the PRC’s evolving solution to countering tactical UAS. One of the systems with high counter UAS potential being fielded to light combined arms brigades is armed with a six barreled 25mm rotary cannon, which possibly uses Programmable Timed Fuse Pre-Fragmented (PTFP) rounds, and also mounts four FN-16 MANPADS on its turret.
During 2022, the PLAA continued to emphasize the fielding and application of modern EW capabilities that are designed to maximize a unit’s combat effectiveness by detecting and degrading/disrupting adversary command and control communications as well as complicating an adversary’s use of tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Similar to the combined arms brigade’s fielding of EW capabilities, the PLAA’s air defense forces have rapidly fielded new counter-air electronic attack capabilities that will complement traditional air defense and support the PLA-wide anti-access, area-denial (A2AD) mission.
Readiness. In 2022, the PLAA continued to improve its methods and standards of training combined arms units. Training encompassed individual to collective soldier events integrating reconnaissance, infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and signal units. In addition to continued PLAA deployments to the LAC on the Indian border, the PLAA conducted multiple “around the clock” large-scale exercises in training areas throughout the country to include joint operations in response to the U.S. and Taiwan actions in 2022.The PLAA used its new PCH191 long-range rocket artillery system during live fire events along China’s east coast as a response to the U.S. CODEL in August 2022. The new long-range MRL is capable of striking Taiwan from mainland China.
In an effort to help develop a more professional military, adjustments were made to the recruitment and promotion of PLAA enlisted personnel. The changes aimed to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. To expand the pool of educated and technically proficient personnel for conscription, the recruitment age for university graduates increased from 24 to 26. The "4+X" service policy was also implemented for the NCO Corps, creating flexibility for intermediate- and senior-level NCOs by helping avoid unwanted demobilization if an NCO fails to meet promotion criteria after their 4-year contract.
Major Ground Units
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● The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines.
● The PLAN commissioned its eighth RENHAI class cruiser in late 2022 and is continuing construction of the RENHAI Guided Missile Cruiser (CG), the LUYANG III MOD Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG), and the JIANGKAI II Guided Missile Frigate (FFG), as well as beginning production on a new class of frigate, the JIANGKAI III.
● In 2022, the PLAN commissioned its third YUSHEN-class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA) and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023.
● In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.
● In the near-term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles, notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.
● The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its EEZ in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including over 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. The PLAN commissioned its eighth RENHAI-class cruiser in late 2022 and continued construction of the RENHAI cruiser, LUYANG III MOD destroyer and the JIANGKAI II-class frigate as well as beginning production of the JIANGKAI III-class frigate. The PLAN commissioned its second YUSHEN-class amphibious assault ship (TYPE 075 LHA) in December 2021 and the third in October 2022 with the first ship in the class achieving initial operating capability (IOC) in March 2022. Construction on a fourth YUSHEN-class LHA likely began in early 2023. In June 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.
The PRC has long challenged foreign military activities in its EEZ in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, in recent years, the PLA has begun conducting the same types of military activities inside and outside the FIC in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States. This activity highlights the PRC’s double standard in the application of its interpretation of international law. Examples include sending intelligence collection ships to collect on military exercises such as the RIMPAC exercise off Hawaii in 2014, 2018, and 2022, TALISMAN SABER off Australia in 2017, 2019, and 2021, and operating near Alaska in 2017 and 2021. Chinese intelligence collection ships also operated near sensitivity defense facilities off Australia’s west coast in May 2022 and near Japan in July 2022. PRC survey ships are also extremely active in the SCS and they frequently operate in the claimed EEZs of other nations in the region such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the PLAN as adjusting to changes in the strategic requirements of near seas defense and far seas protection, noting that it was “speeding up the transition of its tasks from defense on the near seas to protection missions on the far seas...” Towards the PRC’s goal of building a “strong and modernized navy force,” the PLAN has replaced or updated its previous generations of platforms that had limited capabilities in favor of larger, modern multi-mission combatants. Today, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. The PLAN is also emphasizing maritime joint operations and joint integration with the other branches of the PLA. This modernization aligns with the PRC’s growing emphasis on the maritime domain and increasing demands for the PLAN to operate at greater distances from mainland China.
The PLAN organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PLA’s naval and naval aviation forces, as well as the PLA Marine Corps (PLAMC), which is subordinate to the PLAN. The PLAN continues to implement structural reforms that began in late 2015 and early 2016. The PLA-wide reforms removed the PLAN headquarters from conducting operations, which became the purview of the PLA’s joint theater commands, and focused it on organizing, manning, training, and equipping naval forces.
Missions. The PLAN continues to develop into a global force, gradually extending its operational reach beyond East Asia into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly longer ranges, including a continuous presence in the Gulf of Aden. The PLAN’s latest surface and subsurface platforms enable combat operations beyond the reach of the PRC’s land-based defenses. In particular, the PRC’s growing force of aircraft carriers extend air defense coverage of deployed task groups beyond the range of land-based defenses, enabling operations farther from China’s shore. The PLAN’s emerging requirement for sea-based land-attack systems will also enhance the PRC’s ability to project power. Furthermore, the PLAN now has a sizable force of highly capable logistical replenishment ships to support long-distance, long-duration deployments, including two new FUYU-class fast combat support ships (AOEs) built specifically to support aircraft carrier and large-deck amphibious ship operations. The PLAN’s expanding fleet of large modern amphibious warships will enable it to conduct in a wide range of expeditionary operations wherever PRC interests are threatened or in support of PRC participation in internationally sanctioned operations. The expansion of naval operations beyond China’s immediate region will also facilitate its non-war military activities and further legitimize the PRC’s growing global military posture, including at its base in Djibouti.
The PRC is in the beginning stages of operating what the PLA calls its “multi-carrier force.” The PRC continues to learn lessons from operating its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning. Its first domestically-built aircraft carrier, CV-17 Shandong, was launched in 2017 and commissioned in December 2019. The PRC’s next generation of carriers, the new FUJIAN-class – the first of which it is currently outfitting – will have greater endurance and an electromagnetic catapult launch system making it capable of launching various types of specialized fixed-wing aircraft for missions such as airborne early warning and EW. This will increase the striking power of a potential PLAN carrier battle group when deployed to areas beyond China’s immediate periphery. CV-18 Fujian launched in June 2022 and is expected to commission in 2024.
The PLAN’s newest amphibious ships, the YUSHEN LHA and YUZHAO amphibious transport docks (LPD), are modern platforms capable of regional and global expeditionary missions in support of both wartime and non-war contingency operations either singly or as part of capable and flexible task groups composed of multiple amphibious ships and surface combatants.
The PLAN continues to build multiple new, large auxiliary ships that can support force projection operations, including large logistic ships such as the FUYU fast combat support ship (AOE) and specialized platforms for intelligence collection ships (AGI) and ocean surveillance ships (AGOS). The PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the FIC is modest but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms. The PRC’s experience in extended range operations primarily comes from extended task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Other recent extended range PLAN operations include the following:
● In September 2022, a PLAN task group that included a RENHAI class cruiser operated with four Russian combatants near the Aleutian Islands and was shadowed by U.S. Coast Guard ships and aircraft.
● In December 2022 and January 2023, a PLAN task force including a LUYANG III DDG operated in the South Pacific near French Polynesia.
● In December 2022, CV-16 Liaoning with escorts including two RENHAI-class cruisers operated in the Philippine Sea near Japan’s Daito Islands in an area similar to where Liaoning deployed to in December 2021.
● In February 2023, a PLAN task group, that included YUSHEN-class LHA-31, conducted training in the SCS and Western Pacific. This was the first extended range deployment for the newly commissioned LHA.
● The PLAN sustained its counter-piracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden through 2022, a 14year effort that is the PRC’s first enduring naval operation beyond the Indo-Pacific region. In January 2022, the 39th Naval Escort Task Force conducted a three-day escort of Chinese fishing vessels in the Gulf of Aden. Overall, according to Chinese state media, the PLAN has expanded its original mission of escorting Chinese-flagged vessels and vessels from the World Food Program to escorting merchant ships from other countries as well.
Force Structure. The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI-class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants. The PLAN’s force structure consists of three fleets with subordinate submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas, aviation brigades, and naval bases. The PLAN’s Northern Theater Navy is subordinate to the Northern Theater Command, the Eastern Theater Navy is subordinate to the Eastern Theater Command, and the Southern Theater Navy is subordinate to the Southern Theater Command.
Submarines. The PLAN has placed a high priority on modernizing its submarine force, but its force structure continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate new technologies, and expand its shipyards. The PLAN currently operates six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 dieselpowered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS). The PLAN’s submarine force is expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity.
The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO-class SS units, eight of which are capable of launching ASCMs. China’s shipyards have delivered 13 SONG-class SS units (Type 039) and 21 YUAN-class diesel-electric air-independent propulsion attack submarine (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce a total of 25 or more YUAN-class submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO-class submarines (both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the 1990s.
Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear submarines – two SHANG I-class SSNs (TYPE 093), four SHANG II-class SSNs (TYPE 093A), and six JIN-class SSBNs (TYPE 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (3,900NM) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400NM), the PLAN’s six operational JIN-class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Each JIN-class SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles at the PRC’s 70th founding anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation TYPE 096 SSBN will reportedly be armed with follow-on longer range SLBM. The TYPE 096 will likely begin construction in the near future. Based on the projected 30-plus-year service life of the platforms, the PRC will operate its JIN and TYPE 096 SSBN fleets concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for the SSBN force to achieve “stronger growth.”
The PRC launched two SHANG III (TYPE 093B)-class guided-missile nuclear attack submarines (SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls of this class operational hulls by 2025. This new SHANG-class variant will enhance the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (LACM). The PLAN is also improving its anti-submarine warfare capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a robust deep-water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.
Surface Combatants. The PLAN remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for surface combatants. As of late 2022, the PLAN was building an aircraft carrier, a new batch of guidedmissile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, and a new batch of guided missile frigates, including a new 054 variant designated JIANGKAI III. These assets will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities and will be critical as the PLAN expands its operations beyond the range of the PLA’s shore-based air defense systems. By the end of 2019, the PLAN had commissioned its 30th JIANGKAI II-class FFG, reportedly completing the production run. However, in 2021 PRC media reported production had restarted with at least three additional hulls commissioned by the end of 2022 with a total possible end production run of more than 40 hulls. The PLAN augmented its littoral warfare capabilities, especially for operations in the ECS and SCS, with the high-rate production of the JIANGDAO-class Corvettes (FFLs) (TYPE 056 and TYPE 056A). The PLAN commissioned the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021, completing the production run. The PLAN subsequently transferred the early flight TYPE 056 variants, likely 22 ships total, to the China Coast Guard in 2021, probably due to the early models’ lack of towed-array sonar. The remaining JIANGDAOs (056A) are equipped with a towed-array sonar and are, thus, capable of contributing to ASW operations.
The PLAN has expanded its force of large surface combatants with two programs, the LUYANG III DDG and the RENHAI CG. By the end of 2022, the PRC had commissioned 25 LUYANG III DDGs—including 12 lengthened LUYANG III MOD DDGs – with additional hulls under construction. Both the standard LUYANG III and the LUYANG III MOD have a 64-cell multipurpose vertical launch system (VLS) capable of launching cruise missiles, surface to air missiles, and anti-submarine missiles, and the MOD variants will be capable of carrying the new Z-20 anti-submarine helicopter by late 2022, eight RENHAI-class CG’s were in commission in the PLAN with additional hulls under construction. The RENHAI has 112 VLS cells and can carry a large load out of weapons including ASCMs, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), torpedoes, and anti-submarine weapons along with likely LACMs and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) when those become operational. In early 2022, the PLAN released a video of RENHAI CG test launching an anti-ship ballistic missile with a reported/estimated range of 540NM. The new ship launched anti-ship ballistic missile can possibly be launched by the LUYANG III and LUYANG III MOD DDGs.
The PLAN continues to emphasize anti-surface warfare capabilities in its force development. The PLAN’s frigates and corvettes, as well as modernized older combatants, carry variants of the YJ83/ YJ-83J ASCM (135NM), while newer surface combatants such as the LUYANG II-class DDGs are fitted with the YJ-62 (270NM). The LUYANG III-class DDGs and the RENHAI-class CGs are fitted with a variant of the PRC’s newest ASCM, the YJ-18A (290NM). A few modernized destroyers have been retrofitted with the supersonic YJ-12A ASCM (270NM), and the next-generation frigates may also receive this missile. Eight of the PLAN’s 12 KILO-class SSs are equipped with the Russian built SS-N-27b ASCM (120NM). The PRC’s SONG-class SS, YUAN-class SSP, and SHANG-class SSN field the PLAN’s newest domestic submarine-launched ASCM, the YJ-18 which constitutes an improvement over the SS-N-27b ASCM. It is possible the PRC is developing a launcher that can fit inside a standard commercial shipping container for covert employment of the YJ-18 aboard merchant ships.
The PLAN recognizes that long-range ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability to realize their full potential. To fill this capability gap, the PLA is investing in joint reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and communications systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity targeting information to surface and subsurface launch platforms.
As the PLAN continues to transition into a global multi-mission force, the addition of land-attack capabilities to its modern array of anti-surface and anti-air capabilities is a logical next step. In the coming years, the PLAN will probably field LACMs on its newer cruisers and destroyers and the developmental SHANG III SSGN. The PLAN could also retrofit its older surface combatants and submarines with land-attack capabilities as well. The addition of land-attack capabilities to the PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide the PLA with flexible long-range strike options. This would allow the PRC to hold land targets at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific region.
Amphibious Warfare Ships. The PRC’s investment in LHA ships signals its intent to continue to develop its expeditionary warfare capabilities. In April 2021, the PRC commissioned the first YUSHEN-class LHA (TYPE 075) followed by the commissioning of the second hull in December 2021. A third YUSHEN-class LHA was commissioned in October 2022 while the first hull achieved IOC in March 2022, and there are indications of a probable fourth hull under construction in early 2023.The YUSHEN class are highly capable large-deck amphibious ships that will provide the PLAN with an all-aspect expeditionary capability including the ability to carry a large number of landing craft, troops, armored vehicles, and helicopters.
In addition, the PLAN has eight large YUZHAO-class amphibious transport docks (LPD) (TYPE 071) in service. The YUZHAO-class LPDs and YUSHEN-class LHAs provide the PLA with greater capacity, endurance, and more flexibility for long-range operations than the PLAN’s older landing ships, which it has reduced in number over the last decade with obsolete units being decommissioned. The YUSHEN and YUZHAO can each carry several of the new YUYI class air-cushion medium landing craft and/or the conventional YUBU-class utility landing craft, and a variety of helicopters, tanks, armored vehicles and PLAN marines for long-distance expeditionary deployments.
Aircraft Carriers. In December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first domestically built aircraft carrier, Shandong, which launched in 2017 and completed multiple sea trials during 2018-2019. Shandong was photographed at a base on Hainan Island in the Southern Theater Navy in late 2020 and should now be considered to be operational. It is a modified version of the Liaoning (Soviet KUZNETSOV-class) design and likewise uses a ski-jump takeoff method for its aircraft. China launched its third domestically built aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian in June 2022 and continued outfitting work early 2023. CV-18 is larger than CV-16 and CV-17 and fitted with an electromagnetic catapult launch system. This design will enable it to support additional fighter aircraft, fixed-wing early-warning aircraft, and more rapid flight operations and thus extend the reach and effectiveness of its carrier-based strike aircraft. CV-18 is expected to be operational by 2024, with additional carriers to follow.
Ship Based Aircraft. The PLAN operates and is developing several aircraft to operate from its carriers and combatants. In addition to the standard J-15 fighter that currently operates from PLAN carriers, there is a catapult-capable J-15 variant in development. The aircraft is currently testing from land-based steam and electromagnetic catapults. Two other J-15 variants are in development – the J-15S tandem-seat variant and the J-15D electronic warfare variant, which is equipped with wingtip electronic support measures/electronic intelligence gathering pods as well as several conformal antennas. The PRC is also developing a carrier capable variant of the fifth-generation J-31 fighter, known as the J-35, which conducted its first flight in 2021. Beyond fighter aircraft, the PRC is refining the design of a carrier-borne airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, known as the KJ-600. A mockup of the aircraft, which appears externally similar to the E-2C/D Hawkeye, has existed for many years, and prototypes of the KJ-600 have been in flight testing since 2020.
Beijing is also developing the Z-20F helicopter for the PLAN, intended for the RENHAI cruisers and LUYANG III MOD destroyers and possibly the YUSHEN LHAs. The Z-20F is similar to the U.S. Navy’s SH-60 and will provide significant improvements in ASW capabilities over the smaller Z-9 and Ka-28 helicopters the PLAN currently operates. The Z-20F will also complement the larger Z-18Fs that operate from the PLAN’s aircraft carriers.
Accompanying the manned fixed-wing and rotary aircraft will be UAVs. The PLAN have conducted sea trials on multiple surface combatants with vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) UAVs ranging in wingspan between 3.5 and 4 meters. These UAVs can include the SD-40, CSC005, S-100 CAMCOPTER, and AV-500 UAV systems. These UAVs are used for ISR purposes.
Land Based Aircraft. The PLAN is in the process of replacing its older variant H-6 bombers with the H-6J, a naval variant of the H-6K operated by the PLAAF. This new and larger advanced maritime strike bomber has six weapons pylons instead of four, advanced avionics, upgraded engines, and can employ the supersonic YJ-12 ASCM (270NM). In 2020, PLAAF H-6Ks were also photographed carrying YJ-12s, significantly increasing the number of bombers available to the PLA for long-range maritime strike missions.
The PLAN operates a diverse inventory of fixed-wing special mission aircraft for maritime patrol, airborne early warning aircraft including many of the same variants operated by the PLAAF. However, the PLAN also operates a variant of the Y-9 for anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol. This aircraft is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector boom, similar to that of the U.S. Navy’s P-3. This Y-9 ASW variant is equipped with surface-search radar mounted under the nose as well as multiple-blade antennas on the fuselage, probably for electronic surveillance. A small electro-optical (EO)/infrared turret is located just behind the nose wheel, and this variant is equipped with an internal weapons bay in front of the main landing gear.
The PRC also operates a fixed-wing medium to large size UAVs from land bases. These UAVs specialize in ISR and include EO/infrared imaging, signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Many of these UAVs can be operated in satellite communications (SATCOM) mode, extending the datalink and operational ranges well past traditional line-of-sight (LOS) communications. Fixed-wing UAVs include the XIANGLONG high altitude, long endurance UAV; the BZK-005 medium altitude, long endurance UAV; and the ASN-209 medium altitude, medium endurance UAV.
Auxiliary Ships. The PLAN continues to build a large number of seagoing auxiliary and support ships, including AGIs, AGOs, fleet replenishment oilers, hospital ships, submarine salvage and rescue ships, and various other large auxiliaries for specialized missions. Additionally, the PRC’s first domestically built polar icebreaker, XUELONG 2, became operational in 2019. The ship is operated by the Polar Research Institute of the State Oceanic Administration. In October 2022, XUELONG 2 departed for the PRC’s 39th research mission to Antarctica and was followed one week later by XUELONG 1, marking the third occasion both research vessels have conducted a joint mission in Antarctica.
Current Nuclear Sea-Based Capabilities. For the PLAN and CCP, the possession of SSBNs has long been seen as an important symbol in achieving great power status. The PRC has six operational TYPE 094 JIN-class SSBNs, and these submarines are conducting at sea deterrent patrols. The PLAN’s JIN SSBNs are equipped to carry up to 12 sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); JL-2 (CSS-N-14) and JL-3 (CSS-N-20) representing the PRC’s first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent. With six operational SSBNs, the PLAN has the capacity to maintain a constant at sea deterrent presence. With a range of approximately 3,900NM, a JIN equipped with the JL-2 would have to operate in the mid-Pacific Ocean in order to threaten targets in the western half of the Continental United States (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) or east of Hawaii in order to threaten targets on the East Coast of the United States. PRC sources claim the JL-3 has a range of over 5,400NM which would allow a JIN armed with this missile to target portions of CONUS from Chinese littoral waters. The PLAN’s next generation SSBN, the TYPE 096 is expected to enter service the late 2020s or early 2030s. Based on the 30-plus-year service life of the PRC’s firstgeneration SSNs, the PRC will operate the TYPE 094 and TYPE 096 SSBNs concurrently.
The PLANMC maintains a presence at the PRC’s first overseas military base in Djibouti that extends The PRC’s military reach and strategic influence in Africa and the Middle East. In 2020, China highlighted a PLANMC SOF unit that had joined the previously assigned PLANMC unit in Djibouti. The PLANMC’s presence in Djibouti provides the PRC with the ability to support a military response to contingencies affecting China’s investments and infrastructure in the region and the approximately 1 million PRC citizens in Africa and 500,000 in the Middle East, although we have not observed the PLANMC in Djibouti assist in evacuation efforts to date. The PLANMC also embarks a contingent of marines with the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden counterpiracy-focused naval escort task force that supports the PRC’s trade interests. Additionally, the PLANMC supports the PRC’s military diplomacy. For example, the PLANMC at Djibouti have trained with Thai, Pakistani, Saudi, South African, and Djiboutian forces.
The PLANMC’s roles and missions principally include defending PLA bases in mainland China, the SCS and abroad, conducting amphibious operations to seize and defend small reef and island outposts, and conducting non-war military activities (NWMA). Although the PLANMC has traditionally focused on its task to assault and defense of small islands in the SCS, more recently its focus has grown to include expeditionary operations beyond FIC. The PLANMC’s roles under NWMA support the PRC’s efforts to protect its overseas interests including resources, infrastructure, and citizens abroad.
The PLANMC emphasized artillery training throughout 2022 which included training with the PCL-181 vehicle-mounted artillery pieces at various training ranges. The training also incorporated a reconnaissance variant of the Type-05, and it concluded with a multi-brigade culminating event in southern Guangdong. The inclusion of this artillery piece greatly increases the range of their artillery compared to what the PLANMC was previously fielding. Additionally, the PLANMC increased its overall aviation capability in 2022. The PLANMC’s Z-8C helicopter inventory increased to at least 28, bolstering their air assault capability. The PLANMC aviation brigade participated in three-dimensional amphibious assault training during the year which included air assault components, amphibious assault vehicles, and a combination of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and assault boats. This training was conducted in conjunction with a commercial roll-on/roll-off vessel as the PLANMC continues to increase their integration with civilian vessels and expanding their sealift means.
Major Naval Units
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● The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the IndoPacific region.
● The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. The PLAAF continues to modernize with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs.
● In October 2019, the PRC signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 3,150 total aircraft (not including trainer variants or UASs) of which approximately 2,400 are combat aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft). The PLAAF’s role is to serve as a comprehensive strategic air force capable of long-range airpower projection. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the PLAAF’s missions and tasks as transitioning from territorial air defense to “offensive and defensive operations.” In 2021, General Chang Dingqiu assumed the post of PLAAF commander and continued to enact PLAAF reforms to improve the force’s ability to accomplish joint warfighting tasks. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. This trend is gradually eroding longstanding and significant U.S. military technical advantages vis-à-vis the PRC in the air domain.
The CMC’s intent is to transform the PLAAF into a more effective and capable force that is proficient at conducting joint operations. The PLAAF is comprised of aviation, airborne, air defense, radar, electronic countermeasure, and communications forces. Amid the wide-ranging reorganization of the PLA, the PLAAF has reorganized into five Theater Command Air Forces, established at least six new air bases, and restructured previously subordinate regiments into brigades under the new bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber divisions.
Fighters. The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continue to field greater numbers of fourth-generation aircraft (now more than 1,300 of 1,900 total fighters, not including trainers) and probably will become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years. For fifth-generation fighters, the PLAAF has operationally fielded its new J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter, and PRC social media revealed a new 2-seat variant of the J-20 in October 2021. The PLAAF is preparing upgrades for the J-20, which may include increasing the number of air-to-air missiles (AAM) the fighter can carry in its low-observable configuration, installing thrust-vectoring engine nozzles, and adding super cruise capability by installing higher-thrust indigenous WS-15 engines. Development continues on the smaller FC-31/J-31 for export or as a future naval fighter for the PLAN’s next class of aircraft carriers.
Bombers. The PRC’s bomber force is currently composed of H-6 Badger variants, which are domestically produced versions of the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger) bomber. Despite the relative age of its bomber force, the PLAAF has worked to maintain and enhance the operational effectiveness of these aircraft. In recent years, the PRC has fielded greater numbers of the H-6K, a modernized H-6 variant that integrates standoff weapons and features more-efficient turbofan engines for extended-range. The H-6K can carry six LACMs, giving the PLA a long-range standoff precision strike capability that can range targets in the Second Island Chain from home airfields in mainland China. PLAN Aviation has traditionally fielded the H-6G to support maritime missions. More recently, PLAN Aviation has begun operating the H-6J, a maritime strike version of the H6K with six weapons pylons for ASCMs. This aircraft carries six supersonic long-range YJ-12 ASCMs and can attack warships out to the Second Island Chain.
During the PRC’s 70th anniversary parade in 2019, the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N, a derivative of the H-6K optimized for long-range strikes. The H-6N features a modified fuselage that allows it to carry externally an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) that may be nuclear capable. In October 2020, an H-6N was observed carrying an air-launched ballistic missile. The H-6N’s air-to-air refueling capability also provides it greater reach over other H-6 variants that are not refuelable in air. In 2020, the PLAAF operationally fielded the H-6N bomber, providing a platform for the air component of the PRC’s nascent nuclear triad. The H-6N-equipped unit very likely is developing tactics and procedures to conduct the PLAAF nuclear mission. In addition, the PLAAF is seeking to extend its power projection capability with the development of a new H20 stealth strategic bomber, with official PRC state media stating that this new stealth bomber will have a nuclear mission in addition to filling conventional roles. The PLAAF is also developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets. PLAAF leaders publicly announced the program in 2016; however, it may take more than a decade to develop this type of advanced bomber.
Special Mission Aircraft. In 2019, the PLAAF publicly debuted its new Y-9 communications jamming/electronic countermeasures aircraft (known as the GX-11). This aircraft is designed to disrupt an adversary’s battlespace awareness at long ranges. The PLA can conduct air-to-air refueling operations to extend the ranges of its fighter and bomber aircraft equipped with refueling probes using the H-6U, a modified tanker variant of the H-6 bomber, as well as a small number of larger IL-78 Midas. In addition, the PRC is developing a tanker variant of its Y-20 heavy-lift transport, which will enable the PLAAF to expand its tanker fleet and improve the PLAAF’s ability to operate beyond the FIC from bases in mainland China.
Production and deliveries of the KJ-500—the PRC’s most advanced airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft—continued at a rapid pace, joining earlier KJ-2000 Mainring and KJ200 Moth variants. These aircraft amplify PLAAF’s ability to detect, track, and target threats in varying conditions, in larger volumes, and at greater distances, It also extends the range of the PLA’s integrated air defense system (IADS) network. Furthermore, the PRC has produced at least one KJ-500 with an aerial refueling probe, which will improve the aircraft’s ability to provide persistent AEW&C coverage.
The PRC’s aviation industry continues to advance with deliveries of its domestic Y-20 large transport aircraft and completion of the world’s largest seaplane, the AG600. These transports will supplement and eventually replace the PRC’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which to date, consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft. These large transports are intended to support airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial refueling, and strategic reconnaissance operations as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions.
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs). The PRC continues its comprehensive UAS modernization efforts, highlighted by the routine appearance of increasingly sophisticated systems across theater and echelon levels. The last three years have seen several key milestones. These include the airshow display and operational appearance of the Xianglong jet-powered UAS, as well as the unveiling of both the supersonic WZ-8 UAS and a redesigned version of the GJ-11 stealth Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV). The PLA also continues the maritime use of ISR UASs, featuring both the venerable BZK-005 and the newer TW-328/TB001. The PRC is also expanding the applications of large UASs by demonstrating uses including disaster communications, antisubmarine roles, firefighting, and weather modification. Advanced small UASs are increasingly appearing in both military and civilian applications, with Chinese industry remaining a key exporter of UASs and components of all sizes.
In addition to maturing their current capabilities, the PRC is also signaling its efforts in next generation capabilities. Air and trade shows are displaying growing numbers of autonomous and teaming systems, including for combat applications. In these concepts, Chinese developers are demonstrating an interest in additional growth beyond ISR and EW into both air-to-air and air-toground combat, with a substantial amount of development displaying efforts to produce swarming capability for operational applications.
Air and Missile Defense. The PLAAF possesses one of the largest forces of advanced long-range SAM systems in the world, composed of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300) battalions and domestically produced CSA-9 (HQ-9) and follow-on HQ-9b battalions. To improve its strategic long-range air defenses, in 2019 the PRC acquired the SA-21 (S-400) SAM system from Russia. The PRC is also developing its indigenous CH-AB-X-02 (HQ-19), which will likely have a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. The PRC is also developing kinetic-kill vehicle technology to field a mid-course interceptor, which will form the upper layer of a multi-tiered missile defense. The PLA conducted a test of a land-based mid-course interceptor on February 4th, 2021.
The PLAAF Airborne Corps commands six airborne combined arms brigades, a SOF brigade, an operational support brigade, an aviation transport brigade, a training base, and a new training brigade. The six combined arms brigades consist of three airborne infantry, one air assault, one wheeled airborne mechanized (wheeled air droppable armored vehicles), and one tracked airborne mechanized (tracked air droppable armored vehicles).
Each airborne combined arms brigade typically commands four combined arms battalions, an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance and pathfinder battalion, an operations support battalion, and a service support battalion, and possibly a transportation battalion.
Major Aviation Units
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● The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities.
● The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which will cumulatively contain at least 300 new ICBM silos and has loaded at least some intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) into these silos.
● The PRC is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
● The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska. Conventionally-armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability.
The PLARF organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces and associated support forces and missile bases. The PLARF is a critical component of the PRC’s nuclear deterrence strategy and its strategy to deter and counter third-party intervention in regional conflicts. According to the PRC’s 2019 defense white paper, the PLARF is working towards “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force.”
The PLARF fields a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. The PLARF’s groundbased missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of the PLAAF and PLAN. The PLARF’s conventional missile forces include the CSS-6 (DF-15) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) (range 725-850 km), the CSS-7 (DF-11) SRBM (600 km), the CSS-11 (DF-16) SRBM (more than 700 km), land-attack and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (approximately 1,500 km), the hypersonic glide vehicle capable DF-17 MRBM, the DF-26 Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (3,000-4,000km), the CJ-10 (DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km), and the CJ-100 (DF-100) GLCM (approximately 2,000 km). The PLARF’s conventionally-armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific from mainland China. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field. The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS from mainland China. In 2020, the PRC fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target in the SCS. The PLARF is developing and testing several new variants of theater-range missiles and developing capabilities and methods to counter adversary BMD systems. The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert described the primary purpose of the DF-17 as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific. The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska. Conventionally-armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability.
The PLARF is developing ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces with more survivable delivery systems. The PRC has doubled and continues to grow the number of launchers at most ICBM units. The PRC’s ICBM arsenal consists of approximately 350 ICBMs, including fixed and mobile launchers capable of launching unitary and multiple reentry vehicles. The PRC’s fixed ICBMs consist of the multiple CSS-4 (DF-5)-class missiles, one of which is capable of carrying up to five (Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) MIRV’s and a silo-based CSS-10-class missile. The solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 (DF-31)-class and CSS20 (DF-41) ICBMs complement this force. The CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), with a range in excess of 11,000 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. The DF-41 ICBM has been operationally deployed with commentary during the 2019 parade noting that two brigades existed for the system. Additionally, sources indicate a “long-range” DF-27 ballistic missile is in development.Official PRC military writings indicate this range-class spans 5,000-8,000 km, which means the DF-27 could be a new IRBM or ICBM. The PRC probably is developing advanced nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic hypersonic glide vehicle and a fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) system.
CHINA’S ROCKET FORCE System Launchers Missiles Estimated Range ICBM 500 350 >5,500 km IRBM 250 500 3,000-5,500 km MRBM 300 1,000 1,000-3,000 km SRBM 200 1,000 300-1,000 km GLCM 150 300 >1,500 km
Fielded Nuclear Ballistic Missiles
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Fielded Conventional Strike
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● The SSF is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities.
● The SSF’s Network Systems Department (NSD), sometimes referred to as the Cyberspace Force (CSF; 网络空间部队) is responsible for information warfare with an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. The PLA SSF’s Space Systems Department (SSD), sometimes referred to as the Aerospace Force (ASF; 航天部队), is responsible for military space operations.
● The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems—that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.
● The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly and Beijing has devoted significant resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration. SSF works with civilian organizations, such as universities and research organization, to integrate civilian support to military efforts.
The SSF was established in 2015 to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF reports directly to the CMC and supports the entire PLA with its capabilities. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the SSF’s modernization goals as “seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force.”
The SSF oversees two deputy theater command-level departments: the SSD, sometimes referred to as the ASF, is responsible for military space operations, and the NSD, sometimes referred to as the CSF, responsible for information operations (IO), which includes technical reconnaissance, EW, cyberspace warfare, and psychological operations. At the headquarters level, the SSF has a four-department administrative structure that includes the Staff, Equipment, Political Work, and Logistics Departments. As a strategic organization, the SSF is directly subordinate to the CMC, but some of its subordinate units may report to the theater commands in wartime. The SSF provides information support derived from space-, cyber-, and terrestrial-based means to all PLA services and the five joint theater commands. Civilian reserve and militia units – typically comprised of personnel from the Ministry of Information and Industry Technology, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and academic institutions – augment SSF cyberspace operations during peacetime and are organized into specialized units during wartime to support network defense operations.
Network Systems Department. The SSF NSD, also referred to as the CSF, is responsible for information warfare with a mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, EW, and psychological warfare. By placing the SSF NSD missions under the same organizational umbrella, the PRC seeks to remedy the operational coordination challenges that hindered information sharing under the PLA’s pre-reform organizational structure. The incorporation of cyberspace and EW elements under one organization was a crucial step towards realizing the operational concept of integrated network and electronic warfare that the PLA has envisioned since the early 2000s. The NSD operates five theater–aligned technical reconnaissance bases, a number of signals intelligence bureaus, and several research institutes. The NSD provides intelligence support to the theater commands by leveraging a diverse suite of ground-based technical collection assets to provide a common operating picture to geographically dispersed operational units.
SSF SPACE SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT
The SSD, sometimes referred to as the ASF, is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support; space surveillance; space information support; space telemetry, tracking, and control; and space warfare. The PRC seeks to enhance the PLA’s command and control C2 for joint operations and establish a real-time surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning system, and it is increasing the number and capabilities of its space systems, including communications and intelligence satellites, as well as the BeiDou navigation satellite system.
The SSD operates at least eight bases, including those whose core missions are the launch, tracking, R&D, and operation of the satellites vital to the PRC’s overhead C4ISR architecture. The SSD operates tracking, telemetry, and command (TT&C) stations in multiple locations worldwide to guide space missions around the Earth as well as in cislunar and deep space. The SSD also operates Yuanwang space support ships that track satellite and ICBM launches.
China has five launch sites, including four land-based and one sea-based. The SSD’s China Launch and Tracking Control (CLTC) operates all four fixed launch sites in China, in addition to Yuanwang space support ships (SESS), two major satellite control centers—Xian Satellite Control Center (XSCC) and the Beijing Aerospace Control Center (BACC)—and the PLA TT&C system for all Chinese satellites.
Other Space and Counterspace Organizations. The PRC’s space program comprises organizations in the military, civil, defense-industrial, and commercial sectors. The PLA historically has managed the PRC’s space program and continues to support both civilian and military interests. This includes strengthening and investing in its science and technology sector, growing international partnerships, and improving the PRC’s capabilities in space-based ISR, SATCOM, satellite navigation, human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. Although stateowned enterprises are China’s primary space contractors, the PRC is placing greater emphasis on decentralizing and diversifying its space industry to increase competition.
The State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) is the primary civilian organization that coordinates and manages the PRC’s space activities, including allocating space research and development funds. It also maintains a working relationship with the PLA organization that oversees the PRC’s military acquisitions. SASTIND guides and establishes policies for state-owned entities conducting the PRC’s space activities.
The China National Space Administration (CNSA), subordinate to SASTIND, conducts China’s civilian space efforts, including human spaceflight at the Chinese space station, lunar missions, and interplanetary missions. The PRC is increasingly using CNSA efforts to bolster relationships with countries around the world, particularly with the BRI Partners, providing opportunities to cooperate on space issues.
Many space technologies can serve a civilian and military purpose and the PRC emphasizes “military-civil fusion”—a phrase used, in part, to refer to the use of dual-use technologies, policies, and organizations for military benefit. The SSF works with civilian organizations like universities and research organizations to incorporate civilian support to military efforts since there is an already high demand for aerospace talent and competition for finite human resources. China also has a growing commercial space sector that supports government objectives, including remote sensing, launch, and communication services.
International Cooperation. The PRC has extensive civil space cooperation agreements around the world and is an exporter of satellites and space technology. It has more than a hundred cooperative space-related agreements with more than three dozen countries and four international organizations. The PRC is inviting countries to participate on the Chinese space station or International Lunar Research Station, which is jointly led by China and Russia, and has sold satellite launching services and ground stations to countries around the world.
China leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a multilateral organization with rotating leadership whose members include Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey with Egypt, Indonesia, and Mexico as associate members. APSCO oversees a network of space surveillance telescopes and tasking information, and the observation data it collects is funneled through the Chinese Academy of Science’s National Astronomical Observatory of China. The organization is planning to improve optical system capabilities, coverage, and redundancy as well as data sharing networks.
Major SSF Installations
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● The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services.
● The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training.
The PLA JLSF, established in 2016, provides integrated joint logistics support for the PLA. The JLSF commander is Lt. Gen. Wang Liyan. The JLSF is directly subordinate to the CMC and is central to China’s efforts to build a joint, efficient “combat-oriented modern logistics system,” which Beijing views as essential for modern warfare. The JLSF modernizes PLA strategic- and campaign-level logistics by overseeing theater wide supply operations, establishing and coordinating support relationships among PLA service logistics elements conducting joint logistics exercises with the PLA services, and integrating civilian logistics resources into military operations. The JLSF conducts exercises to improve the PLA’s ability to conduct joint logistics operations.
The JLSF is headquartered at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base. It operates five joint logistics support centers (JLSCs) aligned with each of the theater commands that are intended to streamline logistics support to the PLA. Under the JLSCs’ control are units that provide materiel support to the PLA and joint logistics support brigades (JLSBs), who focus exclusively on providing mobile logistics support during combat operations.
The JLSF provides the PLA with joint strategic- and campaign-level logistics, enabling the PLA to conduct large-scale operations. Elements of the JLSF who provide direct wartime support to the PLA fighting force are categorized as weapons and ammunition storage, warehousing, medical services, transport, fuel, engineering and construction management, reserve equipment, and procurement support. During peacetime, the JLSF has authority over the JLSCs’ operations and activities; during wartime, theater commands possibly would assume control of their designated JLSC.
The JLSF integrates civilian resources and equipment into military operations and exercises, leveraging China’s civilian products, services and transportation, to improve resupply and move military personnel and equipment more rapidly. It does so primarily through the use of military representative offices (MROs) comprised of JLSF personnel who embed with civilian transportation companies (air, rail, road, and sea) to plan and manage military transportation. MRO personnel are vital to the JLSF’s military-civilian integration efforts because they understand the technical loading procedures for various modes of transportation, can draft load plans, and provide expertise to reduce load times at points of embarkation. JLSF theater dispatch centers are the headquarters of regional MROs, coordinate PLA mobilization, and are tasked with improving the efficiency of transferring materials and forces between transportation modes.
PLA Training to Improve Readiness. The CMC sought to improve PLA combat readiness, interoperability, and training through the 14th Five-Year Plan and reinforced these priorities through military training mobilization orders and senior leadership guidance. In 2022, Xi emphasized the need for the PLA to adopt the latest technologies in its training and to focus on integrating training with combat operations The PLA conducted multiple large-scale joint exercises and incorporated advanced weapons and equipment, such as during the exercises around Taiwan in August.
Throughout 2022, the PLA sustained the frequency, scale, and duration of joint exercises. The COVID-19 pandemic likely did not significantly impact the PLA’s ability to conduct joint exercises. The PLA successfully completed at least eight bilateral and multinational exercises, conducting naval drills, maritime and aerial patrols, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. Although the PLA has improved some combat deficiencies, the force, as a whole, probably continues to work through challenges with joint operations, command and control, and tactical and small-unit leadership.
The largest unplanned event of the year occurred in August 2022, when the PLA conducted livefire drills—including firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan—in response to the CODEL visit to Taipei in August 2022. During the visit, Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that 27 PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, including 22 that crossed the median of the Taiwan Strait. The PLA’s centerline crossings have continued since August as the PLA maintains a heightened readiness level. Such activity reflects ongoing PLA attempts to normalize median line crossings.
● Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM).
● The PRC primarily uses paramilitary maritime organizations in maritime disputes, selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch in case of escalation.
THE PRC’S INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES
The PRC’s internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the militia. The CCP relies on these forces to address challenges ranging from protests over political, social, environmental, or economic problems, to terrorism and natural disasters. In 2022, the PRC deployed thousands of PLA, PAP, and militia personnel for disaster relief in response to multiple events such as an airplane crash, earthquakes, fires, and floods.
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MPS leads the PRC’s civilian national police, which serves as the front force for public order. The key mission of the MPS is domestic law enforcement and the “maintenance of social security and order” with duties including antirioting and anti-terrorism.
Ministry of State Security (MSS). The MSS is the PRC’s main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service. MSS operations include but are not limited to: protect the PRC’s national security; conduct counterintelligence; combating foreign espionage; and investigate organizations or individuals inside the PRC who carry out or direct, support, or aid other people perceived to threaten national security. On April 26th, 2021, the PRC enacted a new counter-espionage law permitting the MSS authority to identify companies and organizations deemed susceptible to foreign infiltration or influence and require these institutes to implement measures to prevent foreign infiltration.
People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed forces. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation to the PLA during conflict. As part of a security structures reorganization in 2018, the CMC centralized control of the PAP. The same reform also subordinated the CCG to the PAP.
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In addition to its national defense mission, the PLA has formal and informal roles in the PRC’s internal security. As the principal armed wing of the CCP, the PLA is the ultimate guarantor of the CCP’s survival and supports other internal security forces as necessary. The 2020 National Defense Law recognizes this role in assigning the PLA the mission to “consolidate the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system” in addition to external defense tasks.
Militia. The PRC’s militia is a force that can be mobilized for a variety of peace- and wartime missions and is distinct from the PLA’s Reserve Force. The militia is organized by townships, administrative villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and institutions, and the missions may vary widely. In wartime, militia units assist the PLA with its military operations, conduct independent security operations, and provide support and manpower replacement to the PLA. During peacetime, the militia assists in humanitarian aid and disaster relief, supports military training, and maintains internal security. The PRC’s Military Service Law requires male citizens between 18 to 35 years of age who are fit for military service, excluding those already in active service, be enrolled into the militia. The militia is divided into two categories. The primary militia consists of former soldiers, personnel that have received military training, and personnel selected for military training that are under the age of 28, in good health, and politically reliable. The remainder of male citizens between 18 and 35 years of age are considered ordinary militia. The primary militia may recruit female citizens when necessary and the age limits can be waived under special circumstance. Local maritime militia forces, referred to by many western analysts as the Chinese Maritime Militia, perform tasks including safeguarding maritime claims, protecting fisheries, providing logistic support, search and rescue, and surveillance and reconnaissance, often in conjunction or coordination with the PLAN and the CCG.
People’s Liberation Army Reserve Force. The People’s Liberation Army Reserve Force was founded in 1983 and professionalized throughout the 1990s and 2000s. On July 1st, 2020, the PRC amended laws, regulations, and policies to bring the Reserve Force under the command of the Central Committee of the CCP and the CMC. The previous arrangement split control of the Reserve Force between the PLA and local Party committees. Motivations for the change include improving combat capability, facilitating cooperation with active-duty units, and upholding the CCP’s absolute leadership over the military. Chinese sources often stated specifically that the reform would enhance reserve performance in Tibet and Xinjiang. Additionally, the PLA appears to have begun making a partial restructure towards using a PLAA reserve base system to continue to improve facilitation and support for active-duty units.
The PLA Reserve Force is comprised of approximately 510,000 personnel subordinate to the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Rocket Force Reserve. According to PLA documents, active-duty personnel are the backbone of the Reserve Force, but reserve-duty officers and soldiers are its foundation. 2020 National Defense University's Science of Military Strategy states the building of the reserve force is an important part of national defense construction and is the basic and strategic project to consolidate national defense. The primary mission of the reserves is to reinforce active-duty forces for national defense, with a secondary mission to aid in national disasters or maintaining social order.The Reserve Force should be prepared to effectively respond to a variety of emergencies and military threats, safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests, and the core security of the country.
Although originally founded to support the ground forces, reforms in recent years seek to reduce PLAA reserves and increase those for the PLAN, PLAAF, and the PLARF. However, PRC writings suggest that, as of 2018, the Reserve Force was still predominately ground force-centric, with less than 10 percent of reservists serving specialized technical functions in the PLAN, PLAAF, PLARF, or PLA SSF.
Reserve officers are selected from veteran PLA officers, local officials, PAP or militia officers, and other technical personnel. Reserve soldiers are selected from eligible PLA veterans, trained grass-roots militias, and other local or military specialty personnel. Some reserve soldiers also failed to meet active-duty entry requirements and conduct remedial training in the reserves until they are able to join the active-duty force.
The PLA is working to improve reserve mobilization, which anecdotal evidence suggests is hindered by unclear processes. In March 2023, during the PRC’s annual “Two Sessions,” PLA deputies suggested that the PRC should study and prioritize wartime legislation, including the introduction of laws such as the mobilization of reserve forces. Chinese documents also suggest that Reserve Force equipment is old; one report in 2018 stated that more than 70 percent of air defense artillery and artillery equipment is at or beyond its maximum service life. Some of the equipment is no longer manufactured and repair requires cannibalization.
The PLA Reserve Force does not include militias, the Civil Air Defense, or myriad other groups (e.g., the People’s Armed Police or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)).
The PAP is a component of the PRC’s armed forces and an armed wing of the CCP with an estimated 660,000 personnel. In the 2020 National Defense University's Science of Military Strategy, the primary responsibilities of the PAP include maintaining political, institutional and regime security, handling emergency rescue, counter-terrorism, air support, maritime rights protection, administrative law enforcement, and defense operations. The PAP is organized into three main parts: the Internal Security Corps, the Mobile Corps, and the CCG. The Internal Security Corps covers each of the PRC’s provinces, provincial-level cities, and “autonomous” regions. There is not yet a reported permanent presence of the PAP in the Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of Hong Kong or Macao. The Mobile Corps is comprised of myriad PAP units placed to reinforce the Internal Security Corps and provide flexibility in responding to internal security issues. Mobile Corps units are concentrated around non-Han ethnic regions in the West and South (Xinjiang, Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Qinghai) as well as the major cities of Beijing and Shanghai. Xinjiang is a particular focus of the PAP due to alleged separatist activity, as well as its proximity to areas of unrest in Central Asia.
On July 1st, 2020, the standing committee of the PRC’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, approved a revision to the Law on the People’s Armed Police Force which officially recognized the CMC singular command of the PAP, identified the PAP as an important part of the armed forces that fall under the leadership of the CCP, as well as affirming its primary mission set of handling security emergencies, maintaining stability, conducting counter-terrorism operations, and executing maritime law enforcement and rescue. This legal amendment codified and deepened the substantial reforms of 2018, when command of the PAP was centralized under the Central Party Committee and the CMC after decades of dual-leadership under the CMC and State Council (a PRC government body); the China Coast Guard was subordinated to the PAP; and myriad auxiliary duties (e.g., protecting gold mines, firefighting, etc.) were removed from the PAP’s purview to focus its mission on PRC domestic and international security. Chinese media noted that the 2020 PAP reforms included an article that permitted the PAP to conduct certain operations, including counter-terrorism training, outside of the PRC.
Xi and the CCP leadership tasked the PAP with integrating themselves into the PLA’s joint operation system. The PAP is increasingly focused on internal security and joint operations with the PLA and is developing capabilities for rapid response, mobility, and counterterrorism operations. The PAP also conducts training with foreign partners, including at least Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Since at least 2016, PAP forces have likely operated in Tajikistan, patrolling the tri-border region connecting Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the PRC.
In 2022, PAP forces performed rescue operations in Xining following major flooding in August and in Sichuan after a September 5th earthquake and acquired new helicopters to support in counter-terrorism and disaster relief tasks. An emphasis was also placed on PAP SOF training throughout the year, including a maritime tactical joint exercise in June with PLANMC. Additionally, a PAP officer was named as the commander of the PLA Garrison in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, showing a PRC focus of maintaining social stability based on the new commander’s counter-terrorism experience in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.
The CCG is subordinate to the PAP and is responsible for a wide range of maritime security missions, including defending the PRC’s sovereignty claims; combating smuggling, terrorism, and environmental crimes; as well as supporting international cooperation. In 2021, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the Coast Guard Law which took effect on 1 February 2021. The legislation regulates the duties of the CCG, to include the use of force, and applies those duties to seas under the jurisdiction of the PRC. The law was met with concern by other regional countries that may perceive the law as an implicit threat to use force, especially as territorial disputes in the region continue.
Since the law, CCG activity has continued to prompt regional concern. In March 2022, the Philippines lodged a diplomatic protest against the PRC after a CCG vessel reportedly engaged in “close distance maneuvering” near a Filipino vessel in the disputed Scarborough Shoal. In December 2022, Japan reported that CCG vessels stayed in its territorial waters for over 72 hours, the longest continuous intrusion since 2012.
The CCG’s continued expansion and modernization makes it the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world. Newer CCG vessels are larger and more capable than older vessels, allowing them to operate further offshore and remain on station longer. While exact numbers are unavailable, open-source reporting and commercial imagery counts indicate the CCG has over 150 regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (more than 1,000 tons). These larger vessels include over 20 corvettes transferred from the PLAN, which were modified for CCG operations. , The newer, larger CCG vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, multiple interceptor boats and guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters.,
Revised estimates indicate the CCG operates more than 50 regional patrol combatants (more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, and an additional 300 coastal patrol craft (100 to 499 tons).
China’s Maritime Militia (CMM) is a subset of the PRC’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization that is ultimately subordinate to the CMC through the National Defense Mobilization Department. Throughout China, militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and vary widely in composition and mission. CMM vessels train with and assist the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the China Coast Guard (CCG) in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistics support, and search and rescue. These operations traditionally take place within the FIC along China’s coast and near disputed features in the SCS such as the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reed, and Luconia Shoal. However, the presence of possible CMM vessels mixed in with Chinese fishing vessels near Indonesia’s Natuna Island outside of the “nine-dashed line” on Chinese maps indicated a possible ambition to expand CMM operations within the region. The PRC employs the CMM in gray zone operations, or “lowintensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. The PRC employs CMM vessels to advance its disputed sovereignty claims, often amassing them in disputed areas throughout the SCS and ECS. In this manner, the CMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve the PRC’s political goals without fighting and these operations are part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing strategic objectives.
CMM units have been active for decades in incidents and combat operations throughout China’s near seas and in these incidents CMM vessels are often used to supplement CCG cutters at the forefront of the incident, giving the Chinese the capacity to outweigh and outlast rival claimants. From September 2021 to September 2022, maritime militia vessels were a constant presence near Iroquois Reef in the Spratly Islands within the Philippines EEZ. Other notable examples include standoffs with the Malaysia drill ship West Capella (2020), defense of China’s HYSY-981 drill rig in waters disputed with Vietnam (2014), occupation of Scarborough Reef (2012), and harassment of USNS Impeccable and Howard O. Lorenzen (2009 and 2014). Historically, the maritime militia also participated in China’s offshore island campaigns in the 1950s, the 1974 seizure of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, the occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1994.
The CMM also protects and facilitates Chinese fishing vessels operating in disputed waters. From late December 2019 to mid-January 2020, a large fleet of over 50 Chinese fishing vessels operated under the escort of multiple China Coast Guard patrol ships in Indonesian claimed waters northeast of the Natuna Islands. At least a portion of the Chinese ships in this fishing fleet were affiliated with known traditional maritime militia units, including a maritime militia unit based out of Beihai City in Guangxi province. While most traditional maritime militia units operating in the SCS continue to originate from townships and ports on Hainan Island, Beihai is one of a number of increasingly prominent maritime militia units based out of provinces in mainland China. These mainland based maritime militia units routinely operate in the Spratly Islands and in the southern SCS, and their operations in these areas are enabled by increased funding from the Chinese government to improve their maritime capabilities and grow their ranks of personnel.
CMM units employ marine industry workers, usually fishermen, as a supplement to the PLAN and the CCG. While retaining their day jobs, these mariners are organized and trained, often by the PLAN and the CCG, and can be activated on demand.
Since 2014, China has built a new Spratly backbone fleet comprising at least 235 large steel-hulled fishing vessels, many longer than 50 meters and displacing more than 500 tons. These vessels were built under central direction from the PRC government to operate in disputed areas south of 12 degrees latitude that China typically refers to as the “Spratly Waters,” including the Spratly Islands and southern SCS. Spratly backbone vessels were built for prominent CMM units in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan Provinces. For vessel owners not already affiliated with CMM units, joining the militia was a precondition for receiving government funding to build new Spratly backbone boats. As with the CCG and PLAN, new facilities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands enhance the CMM’s ability to sustain operations in the SCS.
Starting in 2015, the Sansha City Maritime Militia in the Paracel Islands has been developed into a salaried full-time maritime militia force with its own command center and equipped with at least 84 purpose-built vessels armed with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls for ramming. Freed from their normal fishing responsibilities, Sansha City Maritime Militia personnel – many of whom are former PLAN and CCG sailors – train for peacetime and wartime contingencies, often with light arms, and patrol regularly around disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums.
The Tanmen Maritime Militia is another prominent CMM unit. Homeported in Tanmen township on Hainan Island, the formation was described by Xi as a “model maritime militia unit” during a visit to Tanmen harbor in 2013. During the visit, Xi encouraged Tanmen to support “island and reef development” in the SCS. Between 1989 and 1995, the Tanmen Maritime Militia, under the authority of the PLAN Southern Theater Navy (then the South Sea Fleet), was involved in the occupation and reclamation of PRC outposts in the Spratly Islands, including Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef.
CMM AND LAND RECLAMATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Since at least 2014, CMM vessels have engaged in covert small scale reclamation activity and likely caused physical changes observed at multiple unoccupied features in the Spratly Islands, including Lankiam Cay, Eldad Reef, Sandy Cay, and Whitsun Reef. Beijing likely is attempting to covertly alter these features so that it can portray them as naturally formed high tide elevations capable of supporting PRC maritime claims out to the farthest extent of the nine-nash line. In contrast to the PRC large-scale reclamation program, which was overt and where the original status of occupied features is well documented, the less well-known historical record about many of the unoccupied features makes them more susceptible to PRC efforts to shape international opinion regarding the status of the features.
Through the National Defense Mobilization Department, Beijing subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate CMM vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities.
● Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all of China’s SOF units lack real-world combat experience.
● China’s SOF does not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all of China’s SOF activities.
● Despite an emphasis to conduct joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
● The PRC categorizes its non-traditional security threats as terrorism (domestic and international), separatism (entities looking to break away from China such Taiwan, Tibet, and the Uyghur minority population in western China), and extremism (primarily religious).
In late 2015, the PRC’s SOF were impacted by a series of reforms that aimed to “reorganize troops and rebuild new-type combat forces. New types of combat forces have been enhanced to conduct special operations, all-dimensional offense and defense, amphibious operations, far seas protection, and strategic projection, aiming to make the force composition complete, combined, multi-functional, and flexible.” In 2016, additional changes to Chinese law were made authorizing the PRC’s SOF to conduct operations outside of China’s borders.
Mission. The PRC’s SOF are tasked to conduct three primary missions; direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. The goal of the PRC’s SOF operations are to prepare the battlefield for their conventional force counterparts by attacking critical areas, degrading enemy operational systems and capabilities, and delaying or disrupting enemy operational activities. In conventional warfare, the PRC’s SOF missions include, but are not limited to, disrupting rear echelon formations and activities, destroying or securing key targets, decapitation, and targeting for fire support. The PRC’s SOF can also conduct humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) missions, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and personal security assignments. While PLA SOF can conduct counterterrorism missions, PAP SOF are specifically tasked with this mission. The PRC categorizes its non-traditional security threats as terrorism (domestic and international), separatism (entities looking to break away from China such Taiwan, Tibet, and the Uyghur minority population in western China), and extremism (primarily religious).
● PLA Army SOF. PLAA SOF train to clear obstacles, operate behind enemy lines, land navigation, reconnaissance, targeting, blocking maneuvers, and first aid. PLAA SOF units from the Eastern Theater Command train for maritime missions by swimming, maneuvering small rubber boats, marksmanship from moving boats, and scuba diving. In a 2016 exercise, forces from a Southern Theater Command Army SOF Brigade (BDE) conducted an air assault mission off the coast then traveled 5 km to the shoreline.
● In September 2020, attack and transport helicopters from the 73rd Army Group (GA) conducted air assault training with elements from a 73rd GA SOF BDE.
● That same month, elements from a Southern Theater Command SOF BDE deployed to a new training area and conducted a command post exercise and force-on-force exercise.
● PLA Navy Marine Corps SOF. PLANMC SOF are trained to conduct ground-based special operations, as well as coastal and maritime missions, including maritime counterterrorism, HADR, NEO and visit, board, search and seizure operations. They train for more than a year learning airborne, rappelling, reconnaissance, secure communication, navigation, driving, search and seizure, demolition, and hand-to-hand combat skills. They also practice deploying rubber boats and fast-roping from helicopters into the water. In December 2020, PLANMC SOF participated in a combined arms island seizure exercise with mechanized infantry units where the SOF used mine-clearing line charges to destroy obstacles with sniper teams in overwatch.
● PLA Air Force Airborne Corps SOF. The PLAAF Airborne Corps, created in 2011, train to conduct high-altitude, high-opening and high-altitude, low-opening airborne missions for critical target seizure, combat search and rescue, and fire support coordination during extraction.
● PLA Rocket Force Reconnaissance Regiment. The PLARF Reconnaissance Regiment which is based in Qinghai, can conduct air, land, and sea missions including counter-ISR, strategic asset protection, special reconnaissance, and target acquisition.
● People’s Armed Police SOF. The PAP has three main SOF units assigned to the two mobile contingents and the Xinjiang Military District. The Mountain Eagle Commando Unit created in 2019 and based in Xinjiang is trained to conduct counterterrorism missions within the province. The other two PAP SOF units, the Snow Leopards Commando Unit and the Falcon Commando Unit, are large rapid reaction forces with mixed capabilities that can be deployed in major contingencies on a national level. These units are also trained to conduct counterterrorism missions along with hostage rescue, and include assault, reconnaissance, explosive ordnance disposal, and sniper teams. The Snow Leopards have strict selection standards with a 40-50 percent of recruits failing the initial screening. The Snow Leopards’ annual “Devil Week” training simulates counterterrorism missions in multiple combat environments including desert, jungle, urban terrain, air, and sea.
Personnel. The PRC’s SOF currently has between 20,000 and 30,000 personnel. The PRC’s SOF units are comprised of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers but are also assigned new conscripts and officers that recently graduated from basic training or military academy, including the Special Operations Academy in Guangzhou. SOF conscripts are selected from volunteers suggesting they are among the most qualified that commit to a two-year term of service. After their two-year commitment, the conscripts are offered to continue service as noncommissioned officers.
Structure and Organization. Beginning in January 2016, the PLA underwent several reforms that impacted the PLA SOF. The seven military regions were reorganized into five theater commands (TC) and five of the 18 GA were deactivated. The PLA SOF were also reorganized assigning a SOF BDE to each GA along with a SOF BDE for the Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts. These and later reforms also impacted the PLARF Reconnaissance Regiment, the PLAAF Airborne Corps SOF BDE, and the PAP SOF units. Some of these SOF units are relatively new and were created using conventional forces to expand the PLA’s SOF capability. All PLA SOF units are supported by the PLA Air Force’s 15th Airborne Corps for tactical insertion, extraction, and resupply.
Each PLA SOF BDE has between 2,000 and 3,000 personnel while a regiment has between 1,000 and 2,000 personnel. While PLA SOF units have discrete missions based on branch and location, their internal structure resembles the PLA Army brigade-battalion-company-team construct with a main, reserve, and rear command structure.
There are three SOF units within the PAP which have a total of six detachments. Three detachments are assigned to the 1st Mobile Contingent based in Beijing, two detachments are assigned to the 2nd Mobile Contingent based in Guangzhou, and one detachment falls under the Xinjiang Internal Contingent.
There is no national-level special operations command responsible for all SOF activities. PLA SOF also does not have organic or dedicated infrastructure or support and therefore must rely on conventional forces to support their missions whereas the PAP does have an internal logistic support system to support its SOF missions.